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PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
IN OKLAHOMA
I.
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to discuss the physicianpatient privilege in general and to suggest the Oklahoma
Legislature either repeal or amend OxLA. STAT. tit. 12, §385 (6)
(1961), especially as it regards personal injury litigation.
There are three instances when the privilege usually is
claimed. The first concerns the truthfulness of an applicant's
representations in suits on insurance policies. Second, the
privilege appears in will contests when the decedent's testamentary capacity is at issue. The third instance concerns
the claim of privilege in personal injury actions where liability is no longer a question, but the extent of injuries is
at issue.'
At common law there was no privilege which a patient
could invoke at trial to conceal communications made by
him to his physician. 2 In the United States, it was not until
1828 in New York that the first statute appeared granting
the privilege. 8 The precursor of the current Oklahoma privilege statute applying to physicians was adopted by Oklahoma's
I Welsh, Another Anomaly - The Patient'sPrivilege, 13 Miss.
L. J. 137 (1941).
2

8

3 B. JONEs, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §838 (5th ed. 1958), [hereinafter cited as JONEs].

2 N. Y. REv. STAT. Part III, ch. 7, tit. 3, Art. 8, §73 (1829):
No person authorized to practice physic or surgery
shall be allowed to disclose any information which
he may have acquired in attending any patient, in
a professional character, and which information was
necessary to enable him to prescribe for such patient as a physician, or to do any act for him as a
surgeon.
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first legislature in 1890.4 This section was borrowed from
the Kansas Code which in turn was patterned after the Code
of Ohio. Ohio's provision resulted from a commission study
for revision of that state's laws on procedure. The commission prepared its statute based on a report in 1850 of the
New York Commissioners of practice and pleading.5 Since
New York was the first state to pass such legislation, the
question arises as to why such a statute ever came into
being in light of the common law policy of disregarding any
privilege in communications between the physican and his
patient.
In 1836 the commissioners on statutory revision in New
York implied the reason for the physician-patient privilege
was the analogy to the already recognized privilege attendant to the attorney-client relationship. 6 Professor McCormick believes that an early English case was the persua
Law of August 18, 1890, ch. 70, § 13, [1890] Okla. Laws 1,
(now OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §385 (6) (1961))

provides in part:

The following persons shall not be competent witnesses: ...

Physicians, as to matter communicated

to them, as such, by patients, in the course of their
professional business, or advice given in such cases.
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 64 Okla. 74, 75, 166 P.
411, 413 (1917).
VIII J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §2380 (a), at 828 (McNaughton
Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE] quoting from the

commissioner's report:
The ground on which communications to counsel
are privileged, is the supposed necessity of a full
knowledge of the facts, to advise correctly, and
to prepare for the proper defense or prosecution of
a suit. But surely the necessity of consulting a medical advisor, when life itself may be in jeopardy, is
still stronger. And unless such consultations are
privileged, men will be incidentally punished by
being obliged to suffer the consequences of injuries
without relief from the medical art, and without
conviction of any offense.
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sive force which led the New York legislators to adopt the
privilege. In that case one justice stated by way of dictum
that:
There are cases, to which it is much to be lamented that the law of privilege is not extended;
those in which medical persons are obliged to disclose the information which they acquire
by attend7
ing in their professional characters.
Professor McCormick is of the opinion the legislatures
of many states, including New York, were receptive to the
idea of privilege in this area because the legislators did not
wish to be accused of looking out solely for the interests
of the legal profession.8 Another writer, quoting from an
1884 issue of TIDy LEGAL

MEDIcixE,

points out that legislatures

were prompted by the protests of the medical profession:
It seems a monstrous thing to require that secrets
affecting the honor of families, and perhaps confided to the medical advisor in a moment of weakness, should be dragged into the garish light of a
lawsuit.9
Furthermore, the Model Code of Evidence did not include the privilege in the preliminary draft:
• . . and it was only after a request from the
American Medical Association that the matter be
reconsidered that the doctor-patient privilege was
included largely as a matter of professional courtesy. 10
However, this propensity for comparing the two privileges is without basis. A client enters the attorney's office
7

T. McCoumcK,

LAw OF

EvIDENcE, §108 (1954)

[hereinafter

cited as McCo~mvcK]; Wilson v. Rastall, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283,
1287 (K. B. 1792).
8

McCoRMvcK §108, at 222.

9 Stewart, Waiver of the Physician-PatientPrivilege Rule in
Personal Injury Litigation, 2 ThE FoRUm 16 (1966).
10 M. Ladd, Privileges, Amz. ST. L. J. 555, 589 (1969).
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many times with litigation on his mind and what he divulges
must be considered in that light. But, a patient usually goes
to see his doctor with a cure, rather than a courtroom, in
his mind."
II.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS
In order for the privilege to be invoked it must first
be determined if the necessary relationship between an
individual and his doctor exists. Generally the basic requirement in order for the privilege to attach is that "...
the professional service of the physician is accepted by
the patient for the purpose of treatment."' 2 This gives
rise to the necessary relationship, but it further must be
determined the communications or information for which
protection is sought has been obtained for the purpose of
treatment, as opposed to examination only,13 although it is
not required the treatment actually be rendered. 4 One early
Oklahoma decision involved prosecution for rape wherein
the prosecuting attorney directed the prosecutrix to be examined by a physician. The court held in accordance with
the general rule, and allowed the defense to call as a witness
the examining physician to testify.1
In another Oklahoma decision involving a rape prosecution the defendant went to a physician to discover if the prosecuting witness was pregnant. The conversation between the
doctor and defendant concerned whether the prosecutrix was
1 McComwcK §108, at 222.
12 58 Am. JuR. Witnesses §413 (1948).
13 "The general rule ...is that where the physician or surgeon
is consulted for the purpose of examination only, and not
for treatment, communications made to him, or information
acquired by him, on such examination, are not privileged."
Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1945 (1937).
14 58 Am. Jun. Witnesses § 415 (1948).
15Leard v. State, 30 Okla. Cr. 191, 235 P. 243, 244 (1925).
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pregnant and if so, if the doctor knew of anything to relieve
the condition. The State on appeal argued the doctor's testimony was admissible because the defendant was not consulting him as a patient. However, the court stated the
defendant went to the doctor for professional advice and therefore the communications fell within the ambit of the privilege.'0
Although the Oklahoma Court stated that the scope of
the privilege statute should not be "unduly extended", it
would seem this is precisely what it did. The statute clearly
pertains to communications ".... with reference to any physical or supposed physical disease .
"...
1' In this case the defendant complained of no physical ailment but sought "professional advice" about the condition of another individual.
The court stated the purpose of the privilege was to protect
the right of privacy. 18 Perhaps the court was tacitly basing
its decision on public policy; if the facts had arisen in a
civil case the interpretation of the statute might have been
different.
It is also a requisite that the communications be intended
as confidential, and where the circumstances surrounding the
communication demonstrate what was revealed was not intended to be confidential, then the privilege is not applicable.19 However, the privilege is not vitiated necessarily because someone other than the physician happens to be present. Most jurisdictions have held that the presence of a
nurse or someone working in a comparable capacity does not
harm the privileged status of communications. Oklahoma
20
has held in accord with this view.
10

17

18
10

20

Williams v.
(1939).
OKLA. STAT.
Williams v.
(1939).
Hammonds
Williams v.

State, 65 Okla. Cr. 336, 340, 86 P.2d 1015, 1020
tit. 12, §385(6) (1961).
State, 65 Okla. Cr. 336, 340, 86 P.2d 1015, 1020
v. State, 366 P.2d 111 (Okla. 1961).
State, 65 Okla. Cr. 336, 86 P.2d 1015 (1939).
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III.

REASONS ASCRIBED TO THE PATIENT'S PRIVILEGE
Regarding evidentiary privileges it has been said:
They do not in any wise aid in the ascertainment of truth, but rather they shut out the light.
Their sole warrant is the protection of interests and
relationships which .

.

. are regarded as of sufficient

social importance to justify some incidental sacrifice
of sources of facts needed in the administration of
justice.21
Although many privilege statutes state the physician is
"incompetent" to testify, this does not mean that his testimony would be untrustworthy or unreliable. The rules of
privilege were designed to apply only in specific instances
where the relationship between certain persons was deemed,
on the basis of public policy, to be of such a special nature
that any communication or information arising therefrom
could not be divulged except with the permission of the
protected individual. Hence, these rules render a witness
incompetent to testify only as to certain matters and do
22
not affect his competency generally.
As there was no recognition of the physician-patient
privilege at common law, it would seem there must have been
some extraordinary reasons which inspired New York to pass
a privilege statute and more than half of the other states,
including Oklahoma, to follow its lead.2 What then are some
21
22
2

McCo~mvcK § 72, at 152.

97 C.J.S. Witnesses §252 (1957).
There are 18 states as well as the United Kingdom which
do not recognize the patient's privilege. Those states are:
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Vermont.
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of the reasons or purposes for which the communications

between a physician and his patient are deemed to warrant
a privileged status?
Two reasons ascribed to the institution of this privilege
are as follows: first, the recognition of the doctor's canons
of secrecy based on the ".

.

. theory that the personal privacy

of the patient's body was entitled to be respected," 24 and
second, legislators' fear of criticism. 25 However these reasons,
although they may have been important considerations in the
passage of the statutes, are not directly related to the purposes
as stated most frequently by the courts.
One of the purposes frequently noted is the belief that
by making the communications privileged, confidence will
be inspired in the patient and he will therefore divulge more
to the doctor, thus better enabling the doctor to diagnose
and treat the patient.26
Another, and perhaps by far the fundamental, purpose
ascribed to the privilege is:
. . . based on a theory of community outrage and

repugnance at having one physician act against his
patient's interest ....

This is an argument based, not

on an intrinsic incompetency, but on the limit the
community places upon a search for truth. That is to
say, the need is not so great that truth must be demanded at the cost of humiliating or embarrassing a
patient by the public disclosure of 27his revelations
made to his physician in confidence.
24

A.B.A. REP. 570, 590 (1938).

25

WIropoE §2380 (a).

26

Curd, Privileged Communications Between the Doctor and
his Patient-An Anomaly of the Law 44 W. Va. L.Q. 165,
168 (1938); see In re Swartz's Will, 79 Okla. 191, 192 P. 203,
(1920).
Note, The Physician-PatientPrivilege 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 263
(1961).

27
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Oklahoma courts have held in accord with this second reason the purpose is to protect the rights of privacy.2 8
These are the purposes which most courts have enunciated
as underlying the physician-patient privilege. Although some
courts may state the purpose a little differently, the import
is generally the same.2 9
IV.

WAIVER
Even if the privilege attaches it still may be waived,
either expressly or by implication30 by anyone with the
right to claim it.31 The basis for waiver has been stated as
follows:
The doctrine of waiver is based upon the theory
that conduct which either reveals the physical injuries
of the patient or discloses the privileged communications destroys any reason for protecting the confidential communications since the patient has already
voluntarily disclosed his 32
physical injuries or the
privileged communications.
The most common example of express waiver is by contract and is found in applications for life insurance. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held this manner of waiver
is permissible under the state privilege statute. In Oklahoma
Protective Assn. v. Montgomery,33 the insured signed an application which stated in part: ". . . I hereby authorize any
physician . . . who has attended me . . . to disclose . . .
28
29

Williams v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 336, 340, 86 P.2d 1015, 1020
(1939).
See generally JoNEs §838.

30 Id. §846.

City of Altus v. Martin, 268 P.2d 228, 234 (Okla. 1964).
M. Hogan, The Physician Patient Privilege In Personal Injury Litigation (Defense Research Institute Monograph,
July, 1968) 18 [hereinafter cited as D.R.I.]
33 160 Okla. 135, 16 P.2d 135, 138 (1932).
31

32
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any information thus acquired. 34 The court emphasized that
the certificate of insurance was issued only on the strength
and as a result of this waiver, and reversed the trial court's
decision that the testimony of attending physicians was not
admissable. Absent reliance by the insurer upon the waiver,
it is doubtful such waiver would have been effective.3 5
The area of express waiver seems to be well settled. Problems arise, however, when implied waiver or interpretation of
statutory waiver are encountered. Most states having the
physician-patient privilege also declare what constitutes a
waiver thereof in their statutes. These statutory definitions
of waiver have been placed in four categories and state waiver
occurs when:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

testimony of physician is offered.
the patient offers himself as a witness,
the trial court compels disclosure, and
the patient commences an action for personal injuries
or puts his mental or physical condition in issue.3 6

The Oklahoma statute3 7 comes within category (2) above,
but with the additional limitation that the waiver extends
Id. at 136, 16 P.2d at 136.
31 Nat'l. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Bell, 144 Okla. 236, 291
P. 106, (1930).
:1 D.R.I. 20.
37 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §385 (1961) provides in part:
The following persons shall be incompetent to
testify: ... A physician or surgeon concerning any
communication made to him by his patient with
reference to any physical or supposed physical disease, or any knowledge obtained by a personal examination of any such patient: Provided, that if a
person offer himself as a witness, that is to be
deemed a consent to the examination; also.... if
[a] . . . physician or surgeon on the same subject,
within the meaning of the last three subdivisions
of this Section.
34
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only so far as the subject matter testified to by the patient. 88
Answering the question of what constitutes a waiver of the
privilege under the Oklahoma statute has proved to be difficult. However, some guidelines have been established. The
first Oklahoma case to construe the privilege statute was
Roeser v. Pease.8 9 In Roeser the plaintiff alleged that she had
received internal injuries which led to backaches and headaches which she had never had prior to the accident. The
plaintiff testified not only with regard to her general health,
but also specifically referred to her headaches. The issue at
trial was whether the accident had caused these pains or
whether they had resulted from some other cause. It is significant to note the plaintiff's doctor was questioned only as
to the plaintiff's health and condition at the time he examined
her. Subsequent to a jury finding in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant's attorney learned from the doctor the plaintiff had
complained of back pains and headaches prior to the time of
the accident. As a result of this new evidence, the judgment
was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, the
court saying:
The effect of her testimony was to lead the jury to
believe that she had not suffered from the same afflictions prior to the accident. If she can go upon the
witness stand and testify that she had not suffered
from these afflictions prior to the accident, and then
prevent the only available impeaching testimony from
being disclosed, by a claim of privilege, it would seem
that a mockery is being made of justice, and we do
not think our statute contemplates such a condition.40
In another early case the descriptive testimony of the
plaintiff as to a bruise on her hip and the pain resulting
88
39

40

Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 67 Okla. 74, 75, 166
P. 411, 413 (1917).
37 Okla. 222, 131 P. 534 (1913).

Id. at 224, 131 P. 537, Fulsom-Morris Coal & Mining Co. v.
Mitchell, 37 Okla. 575, 132 P. 1103 (1913); Terrell v. First
Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 204 Okla. 24, 226 P.2d 431 (1950).
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therefrom was held to be a waiver of her privilege.41 The
court in Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hughes,42 held it was
error to exclude certain testimony of the plaintiff. Here the
plaintiff first testified he received a rupture as a result of
an accident. Later, on cross-examination, the plaintiff stated
he had never told his doctor he had previously been ruptured.
The plaintiff then called his physician and the defendant in
this cross-examination asked the doctor if the plaintiff had
given him a prior history of rupture. The plaintiff's objection
to this question was sustained on the ground of privilege.
However, on appeal the court in effect held that under these
circumstances it was permissible to cross examine the physician with regard to the plaintiff's denial of a prior injury.
Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that
testimony elicited on cross-examination on a subject not testified to in direct examination is not "voluntary" and therefore
does not constitute a waiver.4 3
In 1956, notwithstanding the earlier decisions, the Okla4 4 held that a
homa Supreme Court, in Hudson v. Blanchard,
waiver does not occur when a party takes the witness stand
and testifies as to the facts of an injury.45 The plaintiff had
testified as to her injuries, describing where she was hurt.
Also, the plaintiff testified that the doctor had taped her
side, arm and back, as well as testifying to difficulty in performing household chores. The court stated " . . . [u]nless
the waiver of the privilege provided by the statute be held to
go only to 'communications' with the attending physician, it
becomes
obvious that the statute is meaningless and a nul40
lity.
City of Tulsa v. Wicker, 42 Okla. 539, 141 P. 963 (1914).
64 Okla. 74, 166 P.2d 411 (1917).
-1 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Jones, 185 Okla. 551,
94 P.2d 885 (1939); Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shelton,
135 Okla. 53, 273 P. 988 (1929).
4 294 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1956).
45 Id. at 560.
41
42
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The Hudson decision was contradictory to previous Oklahoma cases on the subject of waiver and has recently been
overruled. Prior to Hudson it had been the law that where a
plaintiff testified in her own behalf as to the nature and extent of her injuries as well as to the time and place for treatment "... . she waived the privilege ... of having her com-7
munication with her physician treated as confidential."4
However, the court in Hudson erroneously construed the
previous decisions stating the waivers had been based on the
patient's testimony about communications concerning the
injuries. Therefore, under the Hudson doctrine unless a patient specifically referred to the conversations he had with
his physician, he could testify at length about his illness or
injury and would not waive the benefits of the privilege.
The problems presented by the holding in Hudson have
since been alleviated by the decision in Robinson v. Lane.48
In Robinson, the plaintiff sued for damages arising from an
automobile accident. He was treated by a number of physicians before and during hospitalization and was examined
one year after the accident by a doctor recommended by his
counsel. The examining doctor testified at trial for the plaintiff regarding his injuries. Later the defendants called two
physicians who had treated the plaintiff while hospitalized.
Plantiff objected on the basis of the privilege.
Justice Williams, speaking for the court, stated the plaintiff voluntarily testified as to the " . .. nature and extent of
his injuries and the time, place and manner of treatment...,,,40
and that under the pre-Hudson decisions this would constitute
a waiver.
City of Tulsa v. Wicker, 42 Okla. 539, 5.40, 141 P. 963, 964
(1914); accord, Strebeck v. Eagle Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 259 P.2d 536 (Okla. 1953). See generally Note,
Evidence-Privileged Communications Between Physician
and his Patients, 11 OiKA. L. REv. 450 (1958).
48 480 P.2d 620 (Okla. 1971).
49 Id. at 621.
47
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The decision in Robinson, specifically overrules Hudson v.
Blanchard, and the court stated that "... when a litigant
testifies concerning a particular ailment and its treatment,
he has removed the reasons for the privilege. By his own
conduct, he has made known to a jury and the public the
ailment or disability he is suffering. After such public disclosure, there is no longer any need for the application of the
privilege." 00
The Oklahoma privilege statute provides in essence that
the only place where waiver of the privilege may be effected
is at the trial of the case since the statute requires the holder
of the privilege to "offer himself as a witness."51 Accordingly,
the Oklahoma Court in Avery v. Nelson 52 held that plaintiff's
testimony in response to questions of the defendant's counsel
in her deposition, regarding communications to her physician,
did not constitute a waiver of her privilege for two reasons.
First, the waiver was not voluntary, 53 and second merely
bringing a suit for personal injuries does not constitute a
waiver.5 4 This second reason in effect means that in Oklahoma,
if objection is made, privileged information may not be obtained through the discovery process.
30 Robinson v. Lane, 480 P.2d 620, 622 (Okla. 1971). The court
states:
... when a litigant testifies concerning a particular
ailment and its treatment, he has removed the reasons for the privilege. By his own conduct, he has
made known to a jury and the public the ailment
or disability he is suffering. After such public disclosure, there is no longer any need for the application of the privilege.
51 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 385(6) (1961).
52 455 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1969). See generally Note, Discovery:
The Physician-PatientPrivilege, Waiver, and the effect of
Avery v. Nelson, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 115 (1970).
53 Id. at 77.
" Id. at 79.
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V.
REASONS FOR ABOLITION
When an individual brings an action to recover for personal injuries two general questions arise. First, the inquiry
as to whether the acts of the defendant were the cause of the
plaintiff's alleged injuries. If this issue can be answered
affirmatively, then the second query materializes- that being
the extent of the injuries sustained, if any, as a result of
the defendant's acts. It is in regard to the second of these
that the physician-patient privilege most often Is claimed, and
when the problem of waiver manifests itself.
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a money judgment in his
favor he must prove he has been damaged, and in order to
demonstrate this he invariably must use medical testimony.
The claim of privilege occurs when the plaintiff places medical
testimony in evidence by way of his treating physican. If the
physican is cross-examined with regard to any communication made to him by the plaintiff-patient, or as to any information gained by him during the course of examination or
treatment, an objection founded on the privilege immediately
ensues. Unless the plaintiff previously has waived the privilege by testifying as to the nature and extent of his injuries
and any treatment, the objection would be sustained under the
existing Oklahoma statute.
However, it is suggested that the physician-patient privilege be abolished in Oklahoma for the following reasons.
At the outset it is maintained when the underlying reasons
for a particular statute are no longer valid, then it is time
to repeal or modify the statute. With this in mind, the reasons
promulgated for the physician-patient privilege should be
examined.
To maintain the privilege statute was enacted to conform
to the canon of secrecy of the medical profession5 appears
55 See pp. 158-59 & notes 6, 9 supra.
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inconsistent when juxtaposed to reality, since the canon is
based on respect for an individual's privacy, and most people
have no qualms about relating to others the circumstances and
extent of their injuries. 56 Also, it has been stated that doctors
support the privilege statute to uphold " . . . their esteem
for the tradition, dignity and honor of the profession". 57 As
regards this, Professor McCormick poses the question that
if the primary result of the privilege is to allow an individual
to testify to the facts of an injury without his physician being
able to refute them,5 s then " . . .does such a privilege, and
such enforced silence, promote the honor and dignity of the
medical profession?"'59
Another reason for the institution of this privilege has
been the analogy of the relationship between the physician
and patient to that of the attorney and client. 0 This analogy
has been vigorously attacked on the basis that a patient who
goes to a doctor for treatment does not, in the majority of
cases, have a future lawsuit on his mind, at least at that time.
However, a client frequently visits an attorney in contemplation of possibility of future litigation.
56 As part of its report to the 61st Annual meeting of the
American Bar Association, the section on judicial administration stated:
And yet the odd thing about the privilege is that
it is usually invoked to protect from disclosure a
bodily condition which has not been kept secret at
all from friends and neighbors, and which only the
tribunal of justice must not learn about.
63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 590 (1938).
57 McCoaI€cK § 108, at 222.
IsIn Hudson v. Blanchard, 294 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1956), the
plaintiff testified regarding injuries to her neck, shoulder
and back as well as to the treatment given by her doctor,
but the privilege prevented the defendant-doctor from
rebutting her allegations by showing x-rays taken by him
when he treated the plaintiff.
59 McConmacK §108, at 222.
60 Id. at 221.
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The distinction between the two relationships has been
recognized by the medical profession. One author, writing
for the Journal of The American Medical Association has
stated:
The services of an attorney are sought primarily for
aid in litigation.., while those of the physician are
sought for physical care . . . the physician being

called upon with comparative infrequency to make
disclosure, would not be consciously affected in his
relation with the patient. The function of the two
learned professions being entirely distinct, the moral
effect upon them of the absence of the privilege would
be different. 61
In commenting on the New York Statute of 1828 one
writer criticizes the privilege saying "[i]f they expected to
close the door to fraud they failed of success for they opened
that door particularly wide. They were, not unnaturally,
misled by the false analogy .

.

. [between the two relation-

ships] . '02 Therefore, although there is an understandable propensity to compare the privilege relating to these two professions, the purposes of each differ and the same rule should not
obtain in each.
A third argument favoring the privilege has been the
concept that if a patient knows his communications to a physician will be kept secret, he will disclose more fully to a
doctor the information necessary for treatment.63 This too is
a false premise. Most people do not know the privilege exists,
although its rationale assumes they do. Even if it were assumed
that patients are cognizant of the privilege, very few would
fail to disclose information based upon the fear someone
would discover their problems during future litigation.0
Morse, Privileged Communications 197 J.A.M.A. 257, 258
(1966).
62 Purrington, An Abused Privilege, 6 CoLum. L. REv. 388,
393 (1906); accord, 4 OKLA. L. Rav. 381, 385 (1951).
6 See p. 163 supra.
Note, Privileged Communications between physician and
01

patient, 33 ILL. L. REv. 483, 484 (1938).
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An individual in need of medical attention, it is submitted,
is primarily concerned about his immediate disability, giving
little thought to possible subsequent testimony. Moreover, in
the eighteen states which never have recognized the physicianpatient privilege as well as other states where the waiver
provisions are very liberal, there is nothing to demonstrate
patients in those states disclose any less to their physicians
than do patients in those states which adhere strictly to the
privilege.6 5
It is interesting to note that the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence provide for a psychotherapist-patient privilege,
but provide none for the doctor and his patient. 6 Doctors and
psychotherapists deal with completely different problems and
the necessity for confidential communications is far more understandable in the relationship between the latter and his
67
patient.
Another reason attributed to enforcement of a physicianpatient privilege is to prevent embarrassment. However, one
writer states that in many cases which he has reviewed, he
found no instances which fit into the " . . . alleged motive
and purpose behind the statute- to prevent humiliation or
shame from disclosure of the nature of the disease. ' 68 Wigmore
See note 23 supra.
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the U.S. District Courts
and Magistrates, R 5-04 (Prelim. draft 1969).
67 The advisory Committee note on the rule, quoting from
Report No. 45, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry,
states:
Among physicians, the psychiatrist has a special
need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to
help his patients is completely dependent upon
their willingness and ability to talk freely.
68 Curd, Privileged Communications Between the Doctor and
his Patient- An Anomaly of the Law, 44 W. Va. L.Q. 165,
168 (1938).
65

66
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poses the following question: "Does the communication originate in a confidence?" 69 The Professor answers his question by
maintaining the majority of things communicated to a doctor
are in no sense confidential.7 0 With the exception of venereal
disease, there are few things which a patient tries to shield
from public view; in fact most problems are openly discussed,
and if not openly visible, are at least communicated to close
friends and relatives. Even assuming some communications
to a physician are embarrassing, this does not mean that all
communications should be suppressed.7 1
In light of the foregoing, it may be concluded the foundations upon which the physician-patient privilege rests are not
solid ones, and therefore the privilege statute should not be
retained. However, there are other grounds which lead to the
same conclusion. Professor McCormick has attributed three
evils to the physician-patient privilege, which are as follows:
1) The exclusion of testimony of the treating doctor upon
the crucial issues of the case, since it is he who has the best
knowledge of the patient's physical or mental condition.
2) The distorted picture presented to the court when a
patient and certain doctors testify, but the treating physician
is not allowed to contradict, and upon which the court or
jury must base its decision.
3) The complexities and problems resulting from a
statute that is repugnant to justice and which leads to conflicting appellate decisions.7 2
Regarding number two above, Hudson v. Blanchard'spre-

sents a unique illustration in that the defendant was also the
619Wi GmoRE
70 Id.

§2380 (a), at 829.

71 D.R.I. 9.
72

McCo~mvcK §108, at 223.

78 294 P.2d 554 (Okla. 1956).

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol7/iss2/5

18

Cosden: The Physician-Patient Privilege in Oklahoma
19711

PHYSICIAN-PATIENT

PRIVILEGE

attending physician. Accordingly he was not allowed to present x-rays of the plaintiff which would have shown the possibility that the plaintiff's injuries resulted from a previous
accident. Thus, use of the physician-patient privilege allowed
only one side of the incident to be heard in court. This same
case also stands as an example of number three in that it
was in conflict with prior
Oklahoma decisions, being over7 4
ruled fifteen years later.

As to the use of the privilege it has been said:
A privilege has its chief practical benefit when it
enables a party to exclude from the record a witness . . . or line of proof which is essential to the

adversary's case, lacking which he cannot get to the
jury at all on a vital issue.75
It is submitted the privilege is used for this reason -as
a
trial tactic- rather than for the grounds which supposedly
underlie it; that " . . . the injustice of such a rule far outweighs its few benefits .. . [and that] . . .it would be more
'76
desirable to abolish the privilege.
VI.

THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE AND DISCOVERY
The physician-patient privilege in Oklahoma, as a result
of Avery v. Nelson77 acts to prevent effective pre-trial medical
discovery in personal injury lawsuits. Although an argument
might be made that the privilege statute does not seriously
hinder the defendant's case because there may be other means
of acquiring medical information, this begs the issue. Although
74

See pp. 167-68 supra.

75 McCo~mucK §81, at 164.

76 Note, Privileged Communications Between Physician and
Patient, 33 ILL. L. REv. 483, 485 (1938); accord, WIGMORE
§2380 (a).
77 455 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1969).
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in Oklahoma a physical examination may be ordered in the
court's discretion,7 8 this may not always be as helpful to an
attorney preparing a defense as it would seem.
It is quite easy to imagine a situation in which two individuals would be diametrically opposed as to the causation of
some particular event. So too, doctors often disagree, not only
to what may have caused a certain injury or illness, but
also to the extent thereof. This point of disagreement is important to a defendant. He must prepare his defense based on
the allegations of the plaintiff, and if he does not know what
the plaintiff's physician believes the cause or extent of the
injury to be, then independent medical examinations, while
helpful, may not be adequate.
Even though a waiver of the privilege may occur at trial,
this does not solve the problems encountered by the defense.
The waiver, if any, comes too late. Many times a plaintiff, in
order to recover, will waive his privilege. Therefore, applicaton of the privilege to the period before trial is opposed to
modern pre-trial discovery purposes. As a result " . . . the
privilege gives the plaintiff patient a decisive tactical advantage since he may prevent discovery and then surprise the
defendant and present the privileged evidence at trial."79
This element of surprise is of special significance when
it pertains to medical evidence. It is hard to attempt to discredit or to conduct a penetrating cross-examination of a
doctor in his field of expertise. In order to do so, a great
deal of pre-trial study is required of the plaintiff's medical
proof. As one author has stated, "[y]ou can't prepare to combat what you don't know about. It's just that simple. ' 80
78

Witte v. Fullerton, 376 P.2d 244 (Okla. 1962).

79 D.R.I. 25.

so Griffin, Pre-Trial Discovery of Plaintiff's Medical ClaimE L. J. 111, 113 (1963).
The Medical Blueprint, 12 DEF
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The above-quoted statement presents succinctly the argument against the physician patient privilege as it relates
to pre-trial discovery. The petitioner in Avery v. Nelson propounded the argument that:
. . . lawsuits are not surprise parties nor guessing
games, but are solemn proceedings . . . to find the
truth and that this result is better accomplished when
both parties to the litigation have equal access to the
evidence which will be offered at trial81
Justice Lavender, writing for the majority, stated that the
court was in complete agreement with the petitioners but
was faced with a statutory provision regarding waiver, and
that it was for the legislature to change the statute.8 2 Justice
Hodges in his dissent stated an election should be made at the
pre-trial conference as to whether the plaintiff claims or
waives the privilege, and that a plaintiff should not be
allowed to claim the privilege before trial and then waive it
when trial begins.P
It is maintained, therefore, the Oklahoma physician-patient
privilege should be abolished altogether in personal injury
suits or the statute should be modified because the privilege
is based on a rationale which has little validity and because
it runs counter to the modern trend in discovery.
VII.
CONCLUSION
Justice Lavender in writing for the majority of the court
in Avery v. Nelson,8 4 with regard to the petitioners argument
that the trend is to permit full discovery and that lawsuits
are not guessing games, stated:
81 455 P.2d 75, 77 (Okla. 1969).
82

Id. at 79.

.M Id. at 81.
84 455 P.2d 75 (Okla. 1969).
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While the court finds itself in complete accord with
the [these] views . . . we also find ourselves facing
a statutory proviso .... 85
and also that:
If it [the legislature] should determine that the privilege statute should be amended to provide that the
filing of a lawsuit in which one asks for damages for
personal injuries shall be ipso facto a waiver of the
privilege, then it is within ... [their] prerogative...
to do so.8 6
It is submitted the time has come when the Oklahoma
legislature should amend the privilege statute. There are a
number of alternatives which could be adopted to replace
the present statute, some of which follow. First of all, the
privilege could be completely abolished. It should be remembered that there was no privilege at common law,87 and that
there are eighteen states which never enacted it.88
Professor Wigmore states "[t]he adoption ... [of a privilege statute] . . . in any other jurisdiction is earnestly to be
depreciated,"8 9 thereby implying the best course of action
would be to discard the physician patient privilege. Professor
McCormick concurs saying the most effective remedy for the
evils of the privilege would be preservation or re-institution
of the common law practice.90
Secondly, and perhaps the next-best solution, would be
the enactment of a statute which provides the privilege be
waived as soon as a suit for personal injuries is filed. Minnesota
has so provided, the statute stating in part:
85 Id. at
86 Id. at

77.
79.

See p. 157 and note 2 supra.
8 See note 23 supra.
89 WIGmOpx §2380 (a), at 832.
90 McCoRwncK §108, at 224.
87
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If at any stage of an action a party voluntarily places
in controversy. .. [his] physical condition... , such
party . .. waives any privilege he may have had in
that action regarding the testimony of every person
who has examined or may thereafter examine him.
91

Pennsylvania also has a similar statute which provides that
physicians may not disclose information concerning a patient
".... except in civil cases, brought by such persons, for damages
' 92
on account of personal injuries.
The third remedy would be the adoption of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, the provisions of which are similar to the
above-described statutes of Minnesota and Pennsylvania. The
Uniform Rules state "[t]here is no privilege . . . in an action
which the condition of the patient is an element or factor
of the claim or defense of the patient ....
Furthermore, the Oklahoma Rules of Evidence were considered in December, 1969 at a meeting of the Oklahoma Bar
Association, and proposed Rules of Evidence were submitted
at that time. The Uniform Rules of Evidence were used as a
guide for the proposed rules, and rule 26 (4)94 is the same as
Uniform Rule 27 (4). These proposed rules have not yet been
adopted, but it is urged the provisions of rule 26 concerning
the physician-patient privilege be given serious consideration.
A fourth alternatve would be the adoption of a rule
similar to the one established in North Carolina. The salient
feature of this statute is that it allows the trial judge to compel
disclosure of the privileged matter "... if in his opinion the
91 MnAqi.

R. Civ. P. 35.03 (1936).
92 PA. STAT. tit. 28, §328 (1936).
93 UI F'om RuLEs oF EvDxcE 27 (4); accoTd, K". STAT.
§60-427 (d) (1965).
94 Oklahoma Rules of Evidence (Tent. Draft No. 3) 40
O.B.J. 1839 (1969).
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same is necessary to a proper administration of justice. ' Dt
This type of statute also has been suggested by professors
WigmoreP8 and McCormick.9 7 Moreover, the American Bar
Association's Committee on the Improvement of the Law of
98
Evidence has recommended the North Carolina statute
However, this solution has been criticized on the grounds
that it does not allow pre-trial discovery and grants too much
discretion to the trial judge, whose decision would be difficult
to overturn on appeal. 99
The process of legislative change generally is snaillike.
.There are usually many obstacles to overcome, including the
interests and fears of individuals within the legislative process. This is exemplified by the experience of the State of
Indiana,10 0 where a statute similar to Uniform Rule of Evidence
27 (4) was passed in both houses of the general assembly. However the bill never was signed by the governor, an attorney,
who believed that it would tend to undermine the other privileges, including that of attorney and client. Therefore, the
analogy between these two relationships not only was partly
responsible for the institution of the physician-patient privilege
but it still survives, making change all the more difficult.
Other states have had success in breaking down this comparison. The State of Oklahoma should also recognize the
distinction and change the archaic rule which has existed
since statehood.
Edward D. Cosden, Jr.

STAT. §8-53 (1969).
96 WiGMORE §2380 (a), at 832.
97 McCoRMvicK §108, at 224.
9s 63 A.B.A. REP. 570, 590 (1938).

'Or N.C. GE.

99 D.R.I. 21.
100 Stewart, Waiver of the Physician-Patient Privilege Rule
in Personal Injury Litigation, 2 TBE FoRrum 16, 34 (1966).
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